Early Modern Documents: Horse Casualties
[posted by Gavin Robinson, 8:35 am, 15 January 2013]
In discussions about early-modern cavalry tactics, some people have asked me how many horses were killed in battles. This is the answer. Actually only a partial answer, but it’s the best one I’ve got. Narratives of English Civil War battles are usually very vague about casualties, if they mention them at all. Financial records are usually a better source for numbers. For a few parliamentary cavalry units, I’ve found detailed lists of horses lost in service. In 1644, Parliament set up the Committee for Taking Accounts of the Whole Kingdom to audit the war effort (you can read the ordinance for appointing the committee at British History Online). One of the committee’s jobs was to certify arrears of pay due to soldiers and officers (Ian Gentles estimated that these ran into millions of pounds). If the commanding officer of a unit couldn’t satisfactorily account for money, horses and equipment he had received, the value would be knocked off his arrears. Losses by enemy action during a battle were usually allowed, giving officers a strong incentive to exaggerate battle casualties in their accounts. This is obviously a problem because the figures they give could be too high, but it also pretty much guarantees that they won’t be too low. The committee concluded that Lionel Copley, a captain of horse in the Earl of Essex’s army, had defrauded the state of lots of money and horses, and overstated his losses at First Newbury to cover it up, but some members of his troop testified against him. I haven’t included his accounts here because they’re incredibly complicated as well as unreliable. Below I’ve put extracts from three other officers’ accounts that give details of horse losses. Doing this made me realise how bad the transcripts I made for my PhD were, but it also shows that I’ve got much better at palaeography. The quoted text is all in Crown Copyright and released under Open Government Licence. Click the links in the document references to see page images on Flickr (non-commercial use only).
Sir Samuel Luke
TNA: PRO, SP 28/127, part 2, f. 26.
This account is for Luke’s horse troop in the Earl of Essex’s army. He was also scoutmaster general of the army and governor of Newport Pagnell, where he had another cavalry troop in his name.
A Discharge for [th]e horse p[er] Contra
- At the Ram in Smithfeild died before the Marching forth 4
- Lost at Edghill fight 30
- Lost in the March to Winchester 12
- Lost at the Seidge of Reading 12
- Lost at Padbury Bridge and dureing the stay at Tame 12
- Lost at Nubury the first 18
- Run unto the King from St Albons 2 troopers with 2
- Lost in Anno: 1644: in the March to and from Cornwell, and at [th]e last Newbury fight 26
- Delivered to my Lord Cofeild 40
This shows the problems with high losses. Did he really lose 30 horses at Edgehill, or did he commit fraud that wasn’t discovered? It’s not clear what he means by ‘lost’. We can’t assume that they were killed in action. Maybe they were captured by the enemy, taken by deserters who ran away from the battle, or just wandered off after losing their riders. There’s no record of where on the battlefield Luke’s troop was deployed, or what part it played in the fighting. This detail is crucial because some of Essex’s cavalry ran off almost immediately while other charged the King’s infantry.
The account gives the impression that losses on the march could be quite high, but mostly doesn’t clearly distinguish this from battle casualties. It’s fairly safe to assume that the four horses that died before leaving London were diseased although the account doesn’t say so. The final 40 were delivered to Lord Caulfield when the troop was merged into the New Model Army in 1645.
Richard Griffin
TNA: PRO, SP 28/266, part 1, f. 32.
Griffin commanded a troop in the Earl of Manchester’s regiment in the Eastern Association army. The troop fought at Marston Moor in 1644, as the account shows. The troopers’ names at the end of each line seem to have been added later, but in the same hand.
A true Account of horse w[hi]ch have beene lost out of Capt. Richard Griffins Troope since the sixth of March 1643[/4]
- Impr[im]is 1 A horse & Armes carried away by Quart[e]rm[aste]r Hustler
- It[e]m 2 A white gelding att Cambridge spoyled and lame Robert Balam
- It[e]m 3 A bay gelding 3 miles beyond Lincolne shoulder shott Phillip Sponer
- It[e]m 4 A bay stone horse att Massam More dead Tho[ma]s Waddington
- It[e]m 5 A blacke stone horse att Massam More dead Hatlye
- It[e]m 6: A white gelding att Massam More dead Jackson
- It[e]m 7 A white gelding twoe myles from Rippon left lame Godwyn
- It[e]m 8 A white gelding shott & dead 2 miles from Knasburrough R: Welton
- It[e]m 9 A bay gelding left lame & spoyled att Maxburrough in yorkeshire W[illia]m Smith
- It[e]m 10 A blacke gelding att Foule Sutton in yorkeshire dyed Tho[mas] Meares
- It[e]m 11 A browne bay gelding lame & spoyled att Tadcaster in yorkeshire
- It[e]m 16 [sic] five horses lost 2 myles from Newberrye
- It[e]m 17 A bay horse taken by [th]e Enemy at Dennington John Nicholson
- It[e]m 18 A gray horse died twoe miles from Basing Browne
- It[e]m 19 Another gray horse dyed twoe miles from Basing: Kilby
- It[e]m 20 A bay horse dyed att Wickham Gardner
- It[e]m 21 A gray gelding left lame hard by Slowe neare Windsor Whitchurch
- It[e]m 22 A bay nagg dyed att Wotton in Bedd Hen[ry] Tadlowe
- It[e]m 23 A white geldding died att Wotton in Bedd Jo[hn] J[...]n
- It[e]m 24 A gray gelding left lame att Wotton in Bedd
- It[e]m 25 A white gelding lost negligently by Phillipp Spooner w[hi]ch he is to make good
- It[e]m 26 A bay gelding carried away by Mr Hearne to [th]e Enemy w[i]th his Armes
- It[e]m 27 A browne bay gelding carried away by Mr Leveridge to [th]e Enemyes
- It[e]m 28 A sorrill nagg carried away by one Standard to [th]e Enemy
- It[e]m 29 A horse & Armes carried away by John Gullson
- It[e]m 30 A gray gelding dyed 2 miles from Sheffeild in yorkshire Tho[mas] [Ul...ton?]
- It[e]m 31 A bay horse died att Sct: Mary Bourne in Wiltsh Johnson
- It[e]m 32 A horse dyed att Burckcleare in Hampshire Hodgson
- It[e]m 33 A gray Stone horse dyed att Barkhamsted in Harfordshire Tho[mas] Meares
- It[e]m 34 A gray Stone horse dyed att Broadwater in Harfordshire Lawe
- It[e]m 35 A bay gelding dyed att London Mr Ward
- It[e]m 36 A bay horse taken by [th]e Enemy att Boston & theire armes Abraham Tilman
- It[e]m 37 A sorrill nagg taken by [th]e Enemy att Boston & there Armes John Day
- It[e]m 38 A gray gelding dyed att Wingrave in Buck
This is where the incentive to exaggerate becomes really important. Griffin claims that only three horses were killed at Marston Moor. It’s very well documented that this was a long, hard fight. Cromwell commanded the Eastern Association cavalry on the left wing and charged Prince Ruperts cavalry early in the battle. Close combat between them lasted for some time, and David Leslie brought in the reserves of Scots horse, which probably tipped the balance. Once Rupert’s men had run away, Cromwell led his wing over to the other side of the battlefield and launched a second charge against Goring. It’s very unlikely that any units were uncommitted, and yet after all this, Griffin lost only three horses. He’s also more explicit than Luke about other losses, so we can see that a lot of the horses died or went lame rather than being killed or captured by the enemy.
Thomas Noakes
TNA: PRO, SP 28/38, part 4, f. 318.
Noakes was a captain under Sir Thomas Middleton in the west midlands.
A p[ar]ticuler of such horses and Armes as were lost and dyed in the states service under the Com[m]and of Captaine Thomas Noakes in the Regiment of S[i]r Thomas Middleton
- 1. Aprill the 29th 1644. John Newmans blacke stoned horse fell sick at Coventry and there dyed.
- 1. May the 2d. Thomas Woodward his horse tyred, & left betweene Litchfeild and Tamworth, & taken up by Litchfeild men.
- 1. May the 7th Hugh Vaughan left his Coulers and with his horse and Armes went to [th]e king.
- 1. May the 15th John Robert[es] left his horse sick at Cosill, and from thence taken away by Dudley men.
- 1. The same day Tho[mas] Turney left his horse lame at Cosill, & there lost as the other.
- 3. The 24th. Will[ia]m Pricklove left his horse sick. Tho[mas] Broome left his black nag lame with another gray nagg lame at Wassall & from thence taken by Dudley men.
- 1. Thomas Barr had his horse & Armes stollen away at Wassall.
- 1. The 11th of June John Trott being kild at Tipton greene, his horse & armes were lost.
- 1. The same day Thomas Tyms lost his horse & Armes at Wedgborough.
- 6. The 17th. Tho[mas] Staploe Cornett, with John Fountaine, Steven Harmer, Rob[er]t Parker, Tho[mas] Childer and Henry Steele did run away from their Coulers with their horses & Armes from Wolverhampton.
- 4. June the 22th. John Clarke, Christofer Greene, John Saunders, Richard Buckley in discontent for want of money, went from Stafford with their horses and Armes, saying there was more due to them, then their horses and Armes were worth.
- 3. June the 23th. Francis Sanders, Tho[mas] Bostocke left their horses lame with another belonging to my troope at grasse in Stafford Castle ground[es], & were taken away from thence by Litchfeild men.
- 1. June the 24th. George Frith left his horse & Armes at the seige of Oswestrey.
- 7. June the last. John Eusam, Tho[mas] Hill, John Haley, Joseph Farr, Will[ia]m Whitehead, Henry Reymond & Geo[rge] Bunckley in discontent left their Colours, and some of their horses & Armes in the feild in Middle Witch, & others in the stables. I deliv[er]ed them in Charge to my troopers, & thorough Carelessenes in their march & at the fight at Oswestry they were all lost.
- 1. July the 2d Corporall Broomer lost his horse at the fight at Oswestrey.
- 2. July the 4th. Tho[mas] Lewin & Mathewe Hagger left their horses tyred within a myle & a halfe of Salop and soe were lost.
- 1. July the 9th George Jefferies, with his horse went to the king.
Again, not many battle casualties, although the fights that this troop was in were smaller than Marston Moor or Edgehill. The biggest losses at Oswestry on 30 June were spare horses that had already been abandoned by their riders. As with Luke’s account, it’s not clear what ‘lost’ means, but in this case it seems likely that they captured rather than killed. This is a bit more explicit with John Trott’s horse, as the account says that he was killed at Tipton Green but his horse and arms were only lost. There’s even more desertion here than in the other accounts. This is probably down to pay being worse in regional armies, because apart from the Eastern Association, they didn’t get their own treasuries or much money from London.
These three accounts don’t give any direct evidence of how cavalry fought in battles, but whatever they were doing didn’t necessarily get many horses killed.
Comment by Averrones — 7:23 am, 16 January 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
Thank you for excellent collection of these accounts. Three lost horses of Griffin’s troop are truly very curious regarding such tense battle as Marston Moor!
If I may be forgiven for a little off-top question, is there a chance that you have already written somewhere some kind of evaluation of early modern methods of training horses for war? In particular, I try to find analysis of how plausible were suggestions for teaching horses to ram and trample man-like figures made of straw and/or suits of armour, e.g. like Vernon wrote in his 1644 pamphlet. Or possibly you know of some other scholars who expressed their opinion about it? The problem is that in the works I found (e.g. in Gervase Phillips, ‘Of Nimble Service’: Technology, Equestrianism and the Cavalry Arm of Early Modern European Armies,” War and Society, 20 (2002), pp.1- 21) such quotes are given as they are, without evaluation.
Comment by Gavin Robinson — 8:48 am, 17 January 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
I suspect that killing the enemy’s horse was a last resort because it was usually better to capture the horse alive. Soldiers were usually allowed to keep captured horses as prize goods, and when they weren’t, it was because the state took them for remounts.
I haven’t seen any direct evidence of how war horses were really trained in 17th century England. I know that Joseph Alexander was employed by Parliament to train horses but there’s no record of how he did it. I think the passage you mentioned is in Vernon, Cruso and possibly some others too so it was probably copied from book to book. That makes it hard to say where it originated and whether it’s realistic.
Comment by Averrones — 10:29 am, 17 January 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
It seems that in Italian Wars and French Religious Wars killing of enemy horse was a despised but frequent practice in clashes with heavyly armoured cavalry. I guess, in 17th century as armour became lighter or absent, that practice almost lost its necessity, though there may be some references to deliberate targeting of enemy horses by musketeers (as fallen horses make next cavalry attacks more difficult)…
Thank you for the answer! As I understand, realistic horse training of 16-17th centuries still awaits its first scholar…
Comment by Gavin Robinson — 3:32 pm, 18 January 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
Henry Foster’s account of first Newbury does mention musketeers shooting horses. Maybe it’s significant that Cromwell’s wing didn’t spend much time fighting infantry at Marston Moor. Fairfax, commanding the other wing, said he did suffer significant casualties from musket fire.
Comment by Tim — 1:31 pm, 19 January 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
I notice that the officers never mention any horses captured from the enemy, or generally ‘acquired’ during their travels. So we only see one side of the balance sheet, that must be written quite carefully as Gavin explains.
Perhaps at Marston Moor Manchester’s regiment managed to capture enough horses from the Royalists to cover all but three of their losses? Perhaps not.
Any idea if the ‘shot’ horses mentioned above are shot by the enemy in battle or skirmish etc or shot ‘to put them out of their misery’ by their riders eg if the horse’s leg was broken?
In battle, I’d imagine the poor accuracy of the muskets meant it was not possible to distinguish between the horse and rider. Pistols were supposed to be fired at short range in cavalry clashes, so more likely to be aimed at the rider. Not sure about mounted carbines? Artillery casualties, while rarer than in Napoleonic times, must have been spectacularly nasty.
Comment by Gavin Robinson — 4:12 pm, 19 January 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
Prizes weren’t usually entered in this type of account. The officers only had to account for horses received from the state. I don’t think there was any requirement or incentive to offset captured horses against battle casualties. In the transcripts I’ve only included losses. Luke’s account also has a list of horses gained on the left of the page, but it’s not very detailed and seems to be only official issues of remounts from commissaries. Horses requisitioned from civilians only tend to show up in parish accounts.
There’s no way of knowing what the ‘shot’ means in these cases.
You’re right about accuracy. Since horses are bigger than men there should be a greater probability of them getting hit if muskets are firing at the unit. Foster doesn’t mention aiming at horses specifically but says that ‘we let flie at them, and made many of them and their horses tumble’.
Comment by Dave Geldard — 12:26 pm, 25 February 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
It’s unclear what the preferred tactic for musketeers facing horse actually was. As re-enactors we tend to demonstrate musketeers running to the shelter of the pike block. In reality this may not have been practical due the size of infantry formations and the distance between the musketeers on the far flanks and the pike in the centre. Overall period drill books tend to suggest that musketeers should try to gain the shelter of the pike stand but some of the suggested formations appear to be very complex (such as cross battle)and must have needed time to form. Given the short effective range of a smoothbore musket slavo (300 yards at very best)and the slow reloading times (lets say 30 seconds for a well trained soldier with a clean musket allowed to ignore a lot of the formal loading drills) and the likely hood of several volleys being fired prior to running for the pike stands becomes pretty low.
Of course this only holds good for open field engagements. At battles such as Adwalton Moor and Newbury where the foot were ensconced behind walls and hedgerows and therefore pretty safe from cavalry I would expect a larger proportion of horses to be hit than at a battle such as Naseby. I suspect that given the poor level of training in the earlier part of the ECW that very few soldiers fired more than one volley at attacking cavalry before running for cover. Of course there is absolutely no good evidence for any of the above, but I feel it makes a decent starting hypothesis.
Comment by Gavin Robinson — 2:05 pm, 25 February 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
That does all seem plausible to me. Would a high ratio of muskets to pikes make it harder for the pikemen to shelter all of the musketeers?
Comment by Dave Geldard — 2:48 pm, 25 February 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
Not necessarily an issue even the NMA only aimed for a 2:1 shot to pike ratio. This appears to have been the overall ratio, but in action small bodies of commanded shot were detached to form forelorn hopes (300 strong at Naseby, baggage guards etc. While this would not have dropped the ratio by much it would have kept it close to 2:1 allowing for some pike losses through sickness and desertion. One pikeman could protect two musketeers crouched inside the reach of his pike. The situation would have been worse for Royalist formations as these are known to have included some shot only units at Naseby.
What I do find interesting is that these shot only units were not provided with any pike support drawn from elsewhere in the Royalist army. This suggests one of two things either the Royalists were very short of pikemen at Naseby and didn’t want to waste them in penny packets, or that they did not expect the shot only units to be at significant additional risk from cavalry compared to mixed units. I suppose there may be a third possibility that they had no other choice. However, if it were the latter I would have thought that these units would have been deployed with a view to minim,ising their exposure and that doesn’t seem to be the case.
Personally I think that the view was that they were not at significantly greater risk than mixed pike and shot units. They may have had to apply different tactics reserving fire in the face of advancing horse to make it extremely risky for the horse to close to pistol range. I also think that cavalry units were wary of getting into melee with formed bodies of steady foot. Most examples of Horse mixing it up with Foot show the Horse making several “charges” without success when attacking frontally and only breaking Foot if they are disordered,caught manouvering, or hit in flank or rear.
My gut feeling is that Cavalry attacking foot sought to look like they would contact but broke off in the face of a determined body of steady foot. They may have used pistols, but probably broke off before getting down to the 15 – 25 yard range required. The Foot meanwhile save their fire because once they have fired they are wide open. I also suspect that there was a lot more posturing and feinting of this nature in all of the fights than Hollywood and TV has conditioned us to expect.
Comment by Gavin Robinson — 3:12 pm, 26 February 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
How practical would it be to fire by ranks and countermarch to the rear during a cavalry attack? In theory, 30s to reload and 6 ranks deep gives a volley every 5 seconds, so even allowing some time to get to the back, maybe 10 seconds. I suppose the problem is that they’d have to leave intervals for the men to move through, which makes them more vulnerable if the cavalry get up to them.
I’m still a bit perplexed by the nimble dragoons at Winceby. Did they manage to reload during Cromwell’s charge, or does it just mean that the first rank managed to get out of the way in time for the second rank to fire?
Comment by Gavin Robinson — 8:24 pm, 4 March 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
Just realised that comments had timed out so I’ve increased the timeout settings.
Comment by Dave Geldard — 5:50 pm, 9 March 2013 [permanent link to this comment]
Although the various drill manuals describe various systems for firings I don’t know of any clear evidence for them being used routinely in the ECW. From a personal point of view even using salvee has issues. The front rank is kneeling making it slower to get out of the way of charging horse. Extraduction requires you to have troops manoeuvring in the face of charging horse and heavily reduces the weight of shot being sent towards the enemy. All in all I think I would choose salvee as the best of a set of poor options.
As an aside I seem to recall that the NMA used a tactic of firing 2 or 3 ranks together in salvee and keeping back the rest of the body. This suggests that the re-enactors favourite tactic of doubling frontage by half files before salvee isn’t particularly accurate. We do it to add weight to the salvee and of course real bodies of shot very much bigger than those we can deploy.
As to Winceby I don’t know the details of the fight that well.